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‘Communalism’ is a term used in India, but invented by colonial rulers in the 
nineteenth century, to refer to the use and manipulation of religious and/or ethnic 
differences for ‘political’ ends antithetical to the national (or colonial) interest. It is 
related to, but very different from, the idea of ‘community’. Arguably, the rise of 
‘communalism’ was partly a reaction to the undermining of older, more local 
communities by rapid economic and social change. During the period of colonial 
occupation alternative outlets for popular unease and discontent included the Indian 
nationalist movement, but the division of this movement into Muslim, Hindu, 
Brahmin, non-Brahmin and other fractions, encouraged by the colonial power for 
strategic reasons, became a hall-mark of Indian politics and social life in the late 
colonial period.  
 The secularist consensus established in the early years after Independence for a 
while promised a new future for India. However, during the past decade, the 
decline of secularism, the decline of the Congress Party, and the emergence of 
fundamentalist parties and organisations has made communalism once more a 
prominent feature of Indian life (Ludden 1990; Basu & Subramanyam 1996). 
Communalism has also spread beyond the subcontinent, the political conflicts 
within India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka increasingly being found mirrored amongst 
the substantial communities of Indians and Pakistanis living abroad.  
 For historians the question of how the twentieth century’s conception of 
community and contemporary ideas of communalism came about is one of 
considerable controversy. However, among contemporary sociologists studying 
community or ‘race relations’ (as they used to be termed) in the United States, the 
Caribbean, Africa, the U.K. or Indian Ocean States it is often assumed that the 
identities of migrant communities are largely brought with them, and that they are 
based upon primordial and age-old forms of identity and conflict to be found in the 
Indian subcontinent. To put it simply, the fact that communalism is endemic in the 
Indian subcontinent today, means that it is considered an ‘essential’ feature of 
Indian society, and it’s appearance elsewhere is therefore regarded as 
unproblematic.  
 The international activities of militant political and religious organisations such 
as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad or Jammia Islamia are likewise predicated upon this 
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CRISPIN BATES 2 
assumption, that the interests and identities of Hindus and Muslims everywhere are 
essentially the same. When looked at more closely however, and in comparative 
perspective, it soon becomes apparent that to ‘be a Hindu’ in Leicester, in England, 
for example, is very different from ‘being a Hindu’ in Durban South Africa, and 
that even within the subcontinent the identities of, for example, Muslims in 
Bombay, and those in Hyderabad, Lucknow or Bangladesh are very different from 
one another.  
 In the book Community, Empire and Migration (Bates forthcoming), a diverse 
group of historians and anthropologists have come together to question some of the 
assumptions of fundamentalists and western sociologists. They attempt to explain 
the divergent historical circumstances that have led to the various outcomes in 
terms of community relations amongst migrant groups in Asia. They also examine 
the origins and consequences of the widely varying identities that have emerged 
among migrant communities within South Asia, and amongst the many 
communities of South Asians scattered beyond the subcontinent in the former 
territories of Britain’s colonial empire.  
 
C O M M U N I T Y  A N D  E M P I R E  
 
Most contemporary scholars are keen to emphasis that ethnic identities are far from 
being primordial (e.g. Brass 1991; Engineer 1985). According to Paul Brass, 
competing elites draw upon, employ and even fabricate myths, symbols and other 
elements from indigenous societies in order to fashion a rhetoric that will mobilise 
populations in pursuit of collective and individual advantages. The 
moderncentralized state plays a crucial role in this process, creating an arena in 
which ethnic nationalism can flourish. Some, such as Etienne Balibar, have even 
argued that nationalism and racism, as well as communalism, are indissolubly 
linked, being part of the process by which modern capitalist economies manage 
and control their populations, in particular, the size and remuneration of the 
workforce (Balibar 1991).  
In the colonial context, the inadequacy of democratic structures renders elite 
leadership all the more important, and efforts by the colonial power to avert the 
emergence of a united front amongst indigenous elites (the strategy of ‘divide and 
rule’), gave further encouragement to the emergence of a multiplicity of ethnic 
nationalisms (Tinker 1976).  
In Africa, the institutions of indirect rule were built upon an assumption by the 
colonial power that African society was already divided into ethnic fractions, a 
theory which then frequently assumed the power of self-fulfillment. By 
empowering specified loyal elites, colonial regimes created a practical locus for 
political activity, even in communities where no such point of focus of power and 
loyalty had previously existed (Vail 1988 ; Lema 1993). The phenomenon is 
referred to as ‘decentred despotism’ by Mahmood Mamdani, who has argued that: 
‘(A)partheid, usually considered unique to South Africa, is actually the generic 
form of the colonial state in Africa’ (Mamdani 1996, p.8).  
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A key basis for the division of indigenous sovereignty in Africa was the idea of 
customary law. Land rights were treated as collective rather than individual and 
every colony had two legal systems, one modern and the other customary, to 
uphold these rights. Power in customary affairs was vested in local ‘Native 
Authorities’, composed of a hierarchy of ‘chiefs’. The consequence of this system 
was a proliferation of representative authorities and their dependent communities, 
creating enormous obstacles to the mobilisation of the population against colonial 
rule. The anti-colonial struggle, when it did erupt, was then often in its earliest 
stages directed against these Native institutions rather than the European authorities 
which sponsored them.  
In India, a similar phenomenon can be observed. Caste, tribe and Indian 
aristocracy were the bulwarks of customary rule, with zamindars and other feudal 
elites invested with unusual powers, a separation of public and private law 
enforced, and the use of caste and tribe as instruments of imperial management and 
control through enactments such as the criminal tribes legislation of the 1870s 
(Robb 1996; Nigam 1990; Cohn 1983).  
However, divisions were not only promoted wilfully by the colonial 
government. Class played an important role too in generating rivalry and conflict. 
Thus not only nationalism, but rapid economic change in the late nineteenth 
century played a part in the emergence of rival caste associations, and revivalist 
and reform movements amongst both Hindus and Muslims (Pandey 1990). In 1909, 
1918 and 1935 the British began to exploit these movements, and the conflicts that 
sometimes resulted, by institutionalising so-called communal differences in 
successive extensions of the franchise. Separate electorates were created for 
Hindus, Muslims, Untouchables and Adivasis, thus making it very difficult for 
nationalist politicians to unify these sections of society in the struggle against 
colonialism.  
British policies, as in the African case, were built upon a highly developed 
epistemology and body of knowledge. Amongst the relevant ideas were the Aryan 
race theories of nineteenth century orientalists, and related developments in 
physical anthropology and linguistics at the end of that century (Bates 1996; Cohn 
1996; Said 1993) By such means the colonial gaze hierarchically arranged subject 
peoples into groups according to their origins and physical characteristics. The 
conclusions of these studies upheld in every case, what Partha Chatterjee has 
referred to as ‘the rule of colonial difference’ (Chatterjee, P. 1997).  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, race and the idea of racial 
difference, together with their constituent elements, the supposedly wholly 
endogamous castes and tribes of Africa and Asia, were generally the most 
important elements in colonial understanding and administrative arrangements. But 
as race theories were undermined by scientific scepticism, facilitated by the end of 
slavery, global migration, and the later genocidal conflicts in Europe, new ideas of 
culture and ethnicity came to take their place. Foremost amongst these was the 
notion of the ‘Plural Society’. First fashioned to justify and explain Dutch policy in 
the colony of Indonesia (Furnivall 1939), the theory was developed and extended, 
to Africa and the Caribbean (Smith 1965; Kuper & Smith 1969), and several other 
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situations, although uncommonly so in the metropolitan societies of the West until 
at least the end of the twentieth century. Typically, the theory - critiqued by Martin 
Legassik (1977) - presented ‘developing’ colonial societies as the mirror image of 
the West. Western societies were seen as organic and unified, consensual 
normative systems, with highly developed institutions of civil and political society 
and a common value system. By contrast, ‘developing’ societies were depicted as 
fractured into their constitutive social elements, their various societies or 
communities living side by side in economic symbiosis but mutual avoidance, the 
only unity being that imposed by the colonial powers.  
This then gave the colonial government an important role not only in 
maintaining order, but in arbitrating these differences, taking upon themselves the 
responsibility of balancing the interests of what were perceived to be the various 
fractions within a population. Hence the policy of separate representation for 
different religious or ethnic communities, and the institutionalisation of procedures 
for consultation with ‘community leaders’ in legislative councils and local 
authorities (a practice followed to this day in the U.K.1).  
At independence, countries as diverse as India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Cyprus 
and Fiji, were left with constitutions which enshrined this idea, these constitutions 
remaining in force for a considerable time with little modification. In some cases, 
such as Mauritius, they have survived almost unchanged to this day. As with the 
policies of indirect rule in Africa, constitutions enshrining the idea of a ‘plural 
society’ frequently created the very social atomism and rivalry which they sought 
to contain. And when competition and rivalry erupt into violence this creates a 
further sense of distance and the process of division is complete (Tambiah 1996). 
The outcome of colonial policies of divide and rule, however, were never as 
predictable as the above narrative suggests, and by explaining the fate of migrant 
Indian communities overseas it is hoped that it may become more easily possible to 
conceive of alternative possibilties of existence.  
 
C O M M U N I T Y  A N D  M I G R A T I O N  
 
Migration is sometimes put forward as being amongst the fundamental causes of 
communalism, leading to the 'mixing' of naturally exclusive communities (see for 
example Weiner 1988). It might alternatively be argued that if migration is indeed 
a determining factor this might simply be because dislocation promotes insecurity. 
Although they are often more prosperous than those they leave behind, 
communities of Indians abroad are beleaguered in a variety of ways - numerically 
                                                 
1 It is noticeable, that whilst police authorities in Britain are enjoined to consult with local 
‘community leaders’ representative of Black, Asian, Muslim, Afro-Caribbean, and 
occasionally Gay and Lesbian ‘communities’, these leaders are not adopted through any 
constitutional or elective process but at the whim of officials. By contrast it is never felt 
necessary to single out and consult ‘white’ community leaders in this fashion since they 
form an almost absolute majority of elected members in local and national government. Not 
a single Muslim M.P., for example, had been elected to the U.K. Parliament until 1997 
when Mohammed Salwar was elected to the constituency of Glasgow Govan – upon which 
he was immediately accused of electoral malpractice. 
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in a minority and culturally marginalised in the societies in which they live, as well 
as forced more often on a daily basis to face the extremes of ‘white’ racism. Within 
the Indian Ocean region however, communities of migrant Indians are to be found 
numerically and culturally in a majority, or at least in significant numbers, as in 
Mauritius and Sri Lanka. Both societies are prosperous. Quite why then communal 
conflict should erupt in one and not in the other remains a paradox. Even closer to 
the Hindu heartland of north India, in cities like Calcutta and Bhopal, migrant 
communities are sometimes able to integrate seamlessly into the societies in which 
they are placed. At other times they suffer apparently irreconcilable differences 
with neighbours from whom they are religiously, culturally or ethnically distanced. 
By focusing on the issue of migrancy as a factor, insights could therefore be 
gained into the genesis of communal conflict. Studies of identity amongst migrant 
South Asian communities elsewhere however are few and far between. Migrancy 
and migrant identities within the Indian subcontinent are yet poorly addressed, 
whilst studies of the Indian communities in the Caribbean, Mauritius, Fiji and 
Africa, have invariably tended to focus on the economic dimension: the nature of 
plantation economies and the various systems of indenture or trade which brought 
them there in the first place (e.g. Daniel V. et al 1992). The Community, Empire 
and Migration volume attempts to fill the resulting gaps by calling upon a wide 
range of experts in the field of migration studies, both historians and 
anthropologists to focus, not on the economic causes and effects of migration 
streams, but on the problems of identity, ethnic conflict and the changing self-
identification of migrants that have resulted. The studies themselves, by authors 
including John Kelly, Karen Leonard, Michael Twaddle, Nira Wickaramasinghe, 
Aminah Mohammad, and Ravi Thiara, are all drawn from atypical contexts within 
the developing world, such as East Africa, Sri Lanka and Fiji, as well as the U.S.A. 
 
M I G R A N T  C U L T U R E S  A N D  ‘ P O S T C O L O N I A L ’  I D E N T I T I E S  
 
A consistent conclusion, noticed in the work of contributors to the volume, 
concerns the apparent adaptability of migrant communities, and the ease with 
which their identities have often integrated or otherwise transformed to meet the 
pressures of different circumstances - a possibly optimistic outcome in an era 
where identities, particularly religious identities, are increasingly regarded as 
intransigent and irreconcilable with one another. The research of John Kelly brings 
this theme very much to the fore, charting the history of Fijian migrant identity 
from ‘coolie’ to ‘Indian’, and the resistance of the Indian population to the 
communal space carved out for them by the British.  
Fiji’s migrant Indians accounted for forty-six per cent of the population by 
1946. Most had arrived under indenture contracts to meet the needs of the island’s 
burgeoning sugar industry. The Fijian indentured labourers were described as 
‘coolies’ by the British, but referred to themselves as girmitiyas, from the word 
‘girmit’ or agreement, referring to the indenture contract2. From the very beginning 
ethnic Fijian and Indian populations were spatially separated, a practice commonly 
                                                 
2 See also Kelly, 1991 and 1992. 
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followed in British colonies, ostensibly to manage, but in practice more often 
affirming colonial preconceptions of racial difference. After 1936 Fijian and Indian 
‘communities’ were also differentially represented politically. The administration 
included members from the ‘Indian’ community within a limited programme of 
self-government in an effort to encourage continuing Indian immigration following 
the abolition of indenture in 1910. (This had been against the wishes of the short-
lived Fiji Indian National Congress, who wanted a ‘common roll’, regardless of 
race).  
Unionisation of the sugar workers, together with the growing size of the 
migrant community created a sense of unease amongst native Fijians, who sought 
to re-assert communal separation and their constitutional preponderance, as they 
saw it. These anxieties culminated after the outbreak of World War II when the 
Fijian chiefs reaffirmed their loyalty, and partnership with the colonial government, 
by offering recruits to fight in Africa or Egypt, whilst the Indians engaged in strike 
action against the Australian monopsony sugar milling company, CSR. The British 
declared sugar to be an essential war-time commodity, and the scene was set for a 
confrontation that surprisingly never took place. After a heated debate, the Central 
Indian War Committee refused to condemn the war, and when called upon by the 
government to organise a volunteer labour corps, voted to disband itself rather than 
either back or confront the government.  
The situation contrasted markedly with that in India, where defiance of the 
colonial government and conflict with its communal allies was the hall-mark of 
Indian nationalism in the 1940s. Kelly explains this by arguing that the indentured 
migrants did not generally think of themselves as ‘Indians’ before they arrived in 
Fiji. Oral evidence suggests that caste and even religious identification was 
extremely uneven from one sugar estate to the next, and that Indian identities were 
numerous and overlapping, unlike the stereotyped roles cast for them by British 
and Fijian politicians. Ultimately, however, the separation of communities was 
reinforced in debates in the National Assembly, and the ethnic Fijian chiefs 
overhauled the ‘Native Regulations’ in 1944, in order to tie the indigenous or 
ethnic Fijians more tightly than ever to their natal villages. These separations, 
ethnic, spatial and constitutional, were maintained against the wishes of Indian 
representatives.  
The implication is that the Indo-Fijians were moving at the time, and have 
presumably continued to move so since, towards a new form of postcolonial 
identity: an identity located outside the framework of colonial discourse. This 
struggle persists on the island to this day, as Indians endeavour not to be the threat 
they are conceived of being by the nervouss Fijian majority. This was evinced most 
recently in the Indian communities’ pacific and conciliatory response to the June 
2000 coup led by the renegade Fijian adventurer, George Speight, against the 
government headed by the island’s first elected Indian primeminister, Mahendra 
Chaudhry. Having organised to win the election, there was no comparable 
organisation of Fijian Indians to resist the rebels, despite highly racist and violent 
assaults on their community, which for some might have easily justified a resort to 
arms in self-defence. 
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C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  I N N O V A T I O N  A N D  T H E  S U B L I M A T I O N  
O F  C O N F L I C T :  T H E  C A S E  O F  M A U R I T I U S  
 
The example of Mauritius presents a very different picture: an island apparently 
without conflict, and where the effects of colonial policies divide and rule, have 
been undermined by a series of carefully constructed political and social 
compromises. While the island is clearly divided on ethnic and religious grounds, 
‘Hindu’ Mauritians follow a number of original customs and practices, quite 
different from those seen in the Indian subcontinent, with whom otherwise links 
and commonalities are considered so important3. Some ‘castes’ in Mauritius in 
particular are quite unrecognisable from a sub-continental perspective, and may 
incorporate mutually antagonistic castes from an Indian setting into a single group. 
Thus, a ‘Rajput’ in Mauritius is of a sudra caste, the title having been usurped 
by this group in the nineteenth century. The terms Hindu and 'Indien' refer 
exclusively to north Indian Hindus. Migrants from Tamilnad identify their religious 
group as Tamil, not Hindu, and minority groups such as ‘Telegus’ and ‘Marathis’ 
are preoccupied with maintaining regional endogamy rather than with caste 
distinctions. The former Brahmin elite are referred to as the Maraz and together 
with the former Rajputs and other Kshatriyas, now called ‘Babujis’, enjoy the 
prestige conferred by high caste status, whilst politically they complain of 
marginalisation. The Vaish are the largest and most influential caste group on the 
island. Internally the group is divided into Koeri, Kurmi, Kahar, Ahir, Lohar and 
other jatis. In the past many admitted to Chamar status (as shown by historical 
records), but recently this seems to have become completely taboo. This group, 
now commonly known as ‘Rajputs’, will also sometimes describe themselves as 
‘Raviveds’.  
Mauritian Muslims may not admit to originating from India at all, connecting 
instead with a broader Islamic identification, whilst Christian Tamils who came as 
slaves or skilled free labourers in the eighteenth century today are a class apart 
from the descendants of nineteenth century Tamils. Only one community freely 
admits to mixed origins and welcomes intermarriage, the Creoles, and even here 
shared religion is a determining factor in most partnerships.  
Because of their numerical preponderance, the Prime-minister has so far 
always been chosen from among the Vaish community. All ‘communities’ are 
represented in the cabinet, and lobbies continually ensure that ethnic interests are 
secured through ‘their’ Minister. Whatever their formal constituency every major 
political party makes a point of inducting members of all communities, but the 
parties have to be led by Vaish if they are to stand any chance of electoral success. 
By one means or another, therefore, the majority community asserts its influence 
and control, even if formally the constitution attempts to effect a balance between 
their interests and those of other groups.  
                                                 
3 This discussion is partly based upon the author/editor’s own first-hand observations in 
Mauritius in 1996 for which acknowledgment is due to support from travel grants awarded 
by the University of Edinburgh’s Hayter and Travel and Research Funds and a generous 
grant from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland.  
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Apparently harmonious, in public at least, in private these arrangements are 
often resented, and although it is not openly discussed, there have been periods of 
serious disharmony in Mauritian society, beginning with rivalry between the elite 
Franco-Mauritian Parti de l’Ordre and the first creole/Indo-Mauritian party, 
L’Action Liberale at the beginning of the century.  
The response of the British colonial government, as in India, was to manage 
popular demands through a strictly limited system of representation according to 
enumerated communities, with elected members outnumbered by officials and 
official nominees in the island’s legislative council. Unsurprisingly, the 
continuation of this system meant that representation by community, even after the 
advent of party politics, became the accepted political practice in Mauritius. Such 
divisiveness that remains in the island’s constitutional arrangements can therefore 
be blamed squarely on the legacy of British rule.  
The electoral process ultimately adopted in Mauritius, with three members per 
constituency elected on the British first past the post system, combined with a 
distribution of seats to the ‘best losers’ from parties representing ‘communities’ 
that had failed to win a place, remains the established system of representation in 
place today. However, this is nothing in itself necessarily harmonious in this 
system. It was only the experience of violent confrontation that persuaded the 
Partie Mauritien Sociale Democratiue under the leadership of Gaetan Duval to drop 
its communalist stance and to seek an alliance with the Labour Party following 
independence. Even then, it was arguably only the subsequent rise of a serious 
common enemy in the Marxist and highly popular trade union based Mouvement 
Militant Mauricien (founded by Paul Bérenger in 1969), and the ideology of MMM 
itself, that helped keep the communal peace thereafter (Mannick 1989).  
We know from Scott (1985), that social and political conflict need not present 
itself in organised, violent or insurrectionary forms, yet may still be significant. 
What seems to have happened in Mauritius since 1968 is that since a formal accord 
has been arrived at to keep it at bay in the political sphere, communal conflict has 
simply been driven underground and into the small scale rivalries of day to day 
life. Your preferred drink, the car you drive, even your superstitions are all 
ethnically determined in modern Mauritius.  
Competition between soft drink manufacturers is common the world over, but 
in Mauritius the Pepsi franchise is owned by the Muslim Gujarati Currimjee 
family, and as a result many Muslim retail outlets sell only Pepsi and at Muslim 
functions Pepsi is served. Biryanis (a traditional Muslim dish), it is said, ‘goes best 
with Pepsi’, which thus has a unique place in the commensal rites of this 
community. The Coca-Cola franchise, by contrast, is owned by a Hindu family, is 
distributed in all Hindu retail outlets and is the preferred carbonated soft drink of 
this community. In their daily lives therefore Hindus and Muslims on the island 
know by their constitution that they belong to different fractions of society, and 
whilst prevented from doing so in Parliament, they act out a communal conflict in 
trivial aspects of their everyday existence.  
These differences only assume more serious proportions when there is an 
apparent threat to livelihood or life and limb. In the wake of cyclone Hollanda in 
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February/March 1994 such a threat existed, when communications were disrupted 
and the island was without electricity for several weeks. A spate of robberies and 
petty assaults ensued. As it became apparent that the police were unable (or, 
allegedly, unwilling), to apprehend the perpetrator(s), the rumour spread that a 
loup-garou, or werewolf, going by the name of Touni-Minuit (‘Naked at 
Midnight’), was on the loose: apparently a respectable member of the community 
by day, but perpetuating terrible crimes under the cover of darkness. Mistrustful of 
the authorities, armed groups of Muslim vigilantes were formed to patrol the streets 
in Muslim majority precincts, which for a while became no-go areas for local 
Hindus. When Muslims stormed a catholic shrine in the capital, asserting that they 
would destroy the spirit of the ‘loup garou’, senior political and ecclesiastical 
figures were hastily roused to calm tensions.  
Whilst seemingly trivial, such incidents, and the persistence of endogamous 
marriage practices on the island, confirm the profound and quotidian nature of 
communal differences on the island of Mauritius. An uneasy truce on the 
communal front has emerged and coalition government has prevailed, but this has 
only been with the backing of repressive Industrial Relations Legislation (limiting 
the power of the MMM), the 1970 Public Order Act and subsequent enactments, 
which prohibit the publication of seditious, communal and libellous articles 
(broadly defined) in magazines and newspapers. There is also considerable 
political influence over the activities of courts of law – inhibiting the prosecution 
of cases that might provoke communal tension.  
In many ways, the situation in Mauritius could be compared to that in Bengal, 
where the rise of the Communist Party of India (M) in the 1960s, a radical but 
highly pragmatic party, has maintained order in what was formerly was one of the 
most communally divided parts of India. However, the current peace in Mauritius 
is arguably a mere simulacrum of the harmony spoken of in the tourist brochures, 
and it prevails most probably despite rather than because of (as some would 
maintain) its colonial constitutional and electoral system. More recently still, the 
sheer prosperity of the island has assisted by divert attention away from politics 
altogether and into the business of making money.  
 
S P A T I A L ,  E C O N O M I C  A N D  C U L T U R A L  A P A R T H E I D  I N  
E A S T  A N D  S O U T H  A F R I C A  
 
In the case of South and East Africa, there is a rather different colonial legacy 
perpetuating developing and perpetuating communal differences. Here, more than 
constitutional divide and rule, a policy of spatial segregation was adopted in the 
colonial period and has subsequently played a crucial role in the construction of 
social difference. On this aspect, Michael Twaddle has taken issue with historians 
such as Robert Gregory (1993) and Prem Bhatia (1973), and East African Asian 
activists such as Yash Ghai who have pointed to ‘Asian exclusivity’ as a major 
cause of communal tensions in East Africa. These historians, rather like many in 
India in the recent past, make the mistake of describing effects as causes, he 
argues, when in reality communalism had not always been a feature of East African 
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society. In illustration of this one can point to the role that Zanzibar has long 
played in Indian Ocean trade, acting as site of interaction between West and South 
Asians for many centuries without dissent. The migration of South Asians did not 
really begin to take off until the completion of the Mombasa railway at the 
beginning of the twentieth century opened up trading opportunities in the interior 
(Seidenberg 1996). The British then made a point of recruiting Indians (particularly 
Ramagharian Sikhs) to run the railway, and growing numbers of South Asians, 
mostly traders from Gujarat, began to arrive.  
Social estrangement however only developed as British officials insisted upon 
residential segregation in the small towns of eastern and northern Uganda. 
Segregation was imposed here upon racial rather than religious grounds, and it was 
race therefore that became the basis for subsequent conflict. The effects of urban 
segregation were then further compounded by a policy which excluded East 
African Asians both from rights of equal representation and from rural landholding 
in African as well as white-settler controlled areas. The effect was what Twaddle 
calls ‘urban imprisonment’ for south asian capital in East Africa, which for want of 
outlets elsewhere, was increasingly exported abroad.  
The segregation imposed upon the East African Asian population was extreme, 
and the social consequences were equally exaggerated. Evidence for the 
phenomenon is seen in population statistics which suggest that prior to 
independence forty-nine per cent of Asians in Kenya lived in Nairobi, whilst thirty-
six per cent of Asians in Tanganyika were based in the city of Dar es Salaam, and 
twenty-seven per cent of Ugandan Asians lived in the capital Kampala, the rest 
being found scattered among the other major cities (Gregory 1993, p.17).  
The restriction of immigration by the British after 1944 finally, Twaddle 
argues, inhibited the development of an ‘Asian’ working class to parallel the 
successful petty bourgeoisie, and the racial stereotype of the acquisitive, 
conservative middle class Asian community was therefore soon complete. Even 
then there was nothing inevitable about the persecution of the Asian community 
from the early 1970s onwards. Despite their obvious differences Africans and 
Asians lived in harmony for many years, and even despite the legacy of spatial 
segregation, the history of South Asian communities in East Africa could easily 
have been a successful one but for the advent of Idi Amin’s anarchical regime in 
Uganda, and the emergent population and economic crises of Kenya.  
 
S O U T H  A F R I C A  
 
The issue of segregation could not of course be anything but important in South 
Africa, but the phenomenon of apartheid was but an extreme example of a policy, 
linked to theories of racial and religious difference, that was put into practice in a 
variety of colonial situations – most obviously of course in India itself, where 
under policies first established by the East India Company, white settlers were 
excluded from farming whilst in the port cities, mines and plantations they were 
given a privileged trading position. Indian capital, by contrast, was largely 
restricted to rural moneylending for much of the nineteenth century.  
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Co-operation between Indians and Africans against Apartheid began in 1947 
with the so-called ‘Doctor’s Pact’. However, these efforts were undermined soon 
after by the infamous 1949 Durban riots, in which Indians were the victims of 
violence primarily provoked by falling real wages amongst African workers. 
Rather than causing the government to question its racists policies, such incidents 
merely persuaded it to re-affirm them, and the Durban riots were cited as pretext 
for the introduction of the Group Areas Act in 1950, which segregated the 
‘communities’, as defined by the South African government, in urban areas and 
became one of the main pillars of apartheid. 
Indians were especially affected by this legislation, and lost a great deal of 
land, especially in Natal. A consequence was a growing social separation of 
Africans and Indians, making co-operation and understanding more difficult to 
achieve. Nonetheless, Indian opposition to these policies was quite explicit. The 
South African Congress rejected the Department of Indian Affairs set up in 1962, 
and called for the creation of non-racial government departments. There was also a 
spectacularly successful organised boycott of the 1983 elections, which evoked 
comparisons with the 1937 elections in India, organised within the communal 
framework of the 1935 Government of India Act. And in 1984 a United 
Democratic Front was established between the African National African Congress 
and the Indian Natal Congress in an attempt to overcome racial barriers (Thiara 
forthcoming).  
Endemic violence, however, has been the principal legacy of apartheid, and to 
this day South African Indians are left with a desire to integrate but a continuing 
sense of fear and beleagurement. After decades of resisting racial segregation some 
respond ironically by re-affirming their ‘Indian’ identity and by building new links 
with the Indian subcontinent. South Africa has thus become a fruitful fund-raising 
and recruiting ground for organisations such as the Santanan Dharm and the B.J.P. 
The democratic government’s response, in its rhetoric of ‘rainbowism’ has 
arguably, in the view of Thiara, done as much to emphasis as to emoliate the weal 
of racial segregation. 
 
M I G R A N T  O R I G I N S  A N D  T H E  P E R C E P T I O N  O F  I D E N T I T Y :  
S R I  L A N K A  A N D  M A L A Y S I A  
 
The population of Sri Lanka, like that of any other country, was highly diverse. 
The origins of the island’s inhabitants did not become an important issue, 
according to Nira Wickramasinghe (1995 and forthcoming), until British scholars 
began to speculate about it in the late nineteenth century and to devise hierarchical 
classifications of various groups according to the historical period in which they 
are supposed to have come.  
The Aryan theory of Indo-European origins was a particularly important 
challenge. In pre-colonial Sri Lanka the notion of Arya existed, but Aryan was a 
status obtainable through the performance of meritorious acts. British physical 
anthropologists by contrast believed it to be a racial category, enabling the 
differentiation of the South Asian population into discrete racial groups. A key 
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moment in Sri Lanka was the translation of the Mahavamsa epic into Sinhalese in 
the early twentieth century by W. Geiger. This assisted Sinhalese intellectuals who 
linked together colonial racial classifications with the tale of Vijaya’s landing on 
the island in the 6th century B.C., thus providing the myth of a common, superior, 
Aryan origin for the Sinhalese people. This was far more appealing than depicting 
them as the descendants of the hordes of the demon-king Ravana (as depicted in 
the Ramayana), or any of the many other popular mythic theories of origin that 
abounded at the time.  
The Vijayan myth captured people’s imagination and became the kernel of 
Sinhalese nationalism. At the same time the identity of migrants was defined as 
everything ‘un-Vijayan’ by Buddhist revivalists and Sinhalese nationalists who 
were attempting to build community consciousness in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. Under the strains the great depression, this negative way of 
defining Sinhalese nationalism bore fateful fruit in violent encounters between 
unemployed Sinhalese and groups of migrant workers. Altogether these 
developments added considerable significance to attempts by the British to devise a 
constitution for Sri Lanka (or ‘Ceylon’ as it was then known), based upon their 
simplistic system of racial classification.  
The very first scheme of democratic reform was announced in 1909. Demands 
for the abandonment of communal representation were rejected, and official 
representatives were in the majority, but just like in Mauritius there were elected 
representatives introduced for each of the ‘communities’, defined by the British as 
consisting of the Europeans, the ‘Burghers’, and ‘Educated’ Ceylonese (including 
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims).  
The Donoughmore commission promised the next major reform in 1928. Sri 
Lanka was a relatively prosperous, well educated and egalitarian society, however, 
and this presented a problem. According to British thinking, the franchise was not a 
right but a privilege, the granting of which must earn the loyalty of colonial 
subjects if it was to serve any purpose. Donoughmore therefore proposed a 
universal adult suffrage, but restricted it to those who could meet a test of residence 
for more than five years, and who affirmed a willingness to remain and 
permanently settle on the island. The issue of the various migratory origins of Sri 
Lanka’s population thus suddenly became a crucial part of the definition of civic 
rights. Wickramasinghe argues that a sharp boundary was thereby created between 
the Sinhalese and more recent migratory inhabitants of the island – particularly the 
Tamil workers on the colonial tea plantations in the highlands. As if this were not 
enough, middle class Sinhalese nationalists demanded further restrictions including 
the retention of a specific literacy test (thereby excluding most Indian workers, as 
well as many Ceylonese). These were accepted, as well as a clause allowing the 
vote to anyone who met a property qualification, thus enfranchising every 
European and the richest Indians. 
The Donoughmore constitution was thus a divisive affair, extending the 
suffrage on a simplistic basis of class and ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, anti-immigrant 
violence was a feature in the run up to the 1936 Council Elections and class and 
ethnicity - more than religion, the key feature in Indian constitutional arrangements 
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in the 1930s - have remained the significant points of fracture in Sri Lankan public 
life ever since.  
Still more significantly, anti-immigration legislation came to be regarded by 
many as the sensible and legitimate way to deal with strains on the economy. And 
thus Sri Lanka introduced stringent restrictions on immigration long before such 
measures were even thought of elsewhere. This process of exclusion became yet 
more virulent in the decades following independence, spawning the Tamil-
Sinhalese civil war that presently divides the island to this day.  
 
M A L A Y S I A  
 
Processes of prescription and exclusion are also prominent in the management of 
ethnic boundaries by the government in colonial Malaysia, where spatial separation 
of ethnic groups, occurred every bit as pronounced as in East and South Africa. 
Encouragement was given furthermore to a distinct vocational segmentation of the 
workforce along ethnic lines. The process of identity construction amongst the 
Indian ‘coolie’ migrants who came to work on the sugar, coffee and rubber 
plantations and government undertakings in the nineteenth century began with their 
definition by the colonial authorities vis-à-vis their Malayan and Chinese 
counterparts. Despite this, many became thoroughly ‘Malayan’ in outlook, and 
where they looked to India for inspiration, it was ‘South Indianness’ (whence a 
large proportion of the migrants came) more than anything else, which became a 
characteristic of the Indian community. 
Initially, Indian emigration to Malaysia was controlled by a few private 
recruiting firms, who were able to charge a high level of commission.4 For this 
reason the colonial government stepped in to plan and direct mass Indian 
migration. Indian labour was preferred because of its alleged docility, a perception 
probably related to its low cost, poverty, lack of unionisation and greater 
dependence on the employer (Kaur forthcoming). This was in contrast to the 
‘surly’ Malayan workers who, if they didn’t like the working conditions, could 
more easily go home, or the ‘industrious’ Chinese who were better organised and 
were more commonly paid on a work-related basis, rather than a fixed wage. These 
stereotypes strengthened the case for further Indian immigration, the main purpose 
and effect of which was to depress wages. The truth of this is shown in the frequent 
and hardly credible appeals by plantations owners for more indentured labourers on 
the grounds of ‘labour shortage’, whilst simultaneously complaining of the 
desertion of labourers to Chinese enterprises where the pay was better. A further 
problem was the monopolisation of Chinese immigration by the Chinese 
enterprises, especially tin mining. The colonial authorities could not easily access 
or control this market, yet the Chinese entrepreneurs were major rivals to the 
Europeans. For this problem indentured Indian labour was the favoured solution, 
and after the abolition of indenture the kangani system (recruitment by returnee 
migrants, in exchange for a commission) was followed up until 1938 - a similar 
                                                 
4 See Kaur, 1997. 
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system to that adopted in other colonial plantation economies, including Mauritius 
(Carter 1995).  
In place of the indenture contract, the kangani recruit was tied to his employer 
by debt, an equally powerful instrument, and the workers were housed in guarded 
compounds close to the plantations, with the kangani acting as an overseer or 
foreman. The workers were unskilled when recruited, and schooling and training 
was completely unknown until the 1930s, when the government was pressured into 
giving some grants for education. For this reason the Indian labourers, whilst a 
minority, were also always less mobile, were largely confined to rural districts, and 
were to be found in the lowest paid and lowest status occupations, even after the 
end of World War II. Prejudices against them were compounded by the fact that 
they were treated, and regarded, as transients, despite the growing numbers of 
second and third generation Indo-Malaysians resident by the 1930s.  
In consequence of these and other factors, it was relatively late in the day that 
the Indian migrants began to organise and develop the sort of solidarity commonly 
seen amongst Chinese workers, a fact which was used by the colonial government 
and plantation owners to play one community off against another, particularly 
when the need arose for strike breaking. Little wonder then that communal 
divisions remains deeply entrenched to this day, although there have been several 
occasions when Chinese and Indian workers have fought valiantly against it. Thus 
in the 1920s there was a remarkable rise in working class Indian consciousness, 
resulting in a wave of strikes - most notably those of 1927 in the railways depots 
and other public works, and in 1937-40 on the Penang waterfront which were so 
serious that the British resorted to using troops to control the pickets (Sandhu 
1993). By far the largest strike of all was that in the Batu Arang Colliery in 1937, 
which saw Indian workers joining with Chinese in protest. Furthermore, whilst few 
Indians joined the Malayan Communist Party, the growth in striking fostered a link 
between Indians and the trade unions, in particular the General Labour Union, 
which played a prominent role in post-war politics.  
Self-assertion can also be seen in the growth of a Dravidian revivalist 
movement opposed to caste prejudice, and a reform movement promoting the 
education of the younger generation (Arasaratnam 1970, 1993). These egalitarian 
developments were promoted by Jawaharlal Nehru, who on a visit in 1950 urged 
the Indians to think less of India and to do more to contribute to Malaysian national 
life. This encouraged the M.I.C. to develop ties with other Malayan political 
parties, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA), with whom they formed a united front to contest the 
federal elections in 1955. Thus the qualities of ‘unIndianness’ within the I.M.C., 
much as with the South African Indian Congress, facilitated the creation of 
alliances with indigenous political parties – a remarkable outcome in the light of 
the segregationist practices of the colonial regime. In the wake of the violence of 
the Malaysian Communist insurgency in the early 1950s, and ethnic riots in 1969, 
the need for unity remained an important feature on the political agenda in 
independent Malaysia. It is only since independence that religion has become a 
divisive issue, the ‘Islamicisation’ of the Malaysian nation, provoking anxiety 
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amongst indigenous Chinese and Hindus. Given past precedents, however, there 
are grounds for optimism that these anxieties may be overcome. Ethnicity, in-built 
as it was in the very framework of the economy, is still likely to remain an 
important line of fissure in the Malaysian body politic. A space for Indians is 
nonetheless being created within Malaysian society. The process must though 
involve a recognition by historians of the reality of positive developments that have 
already taken place in the past. 
 
T H E  E V O L U T I O N  O F  T E R R I T O R I A L  E T H N I C I T Y :  T H E  
M O H A J I R S  I N  P A K I S T A N   
 
For a more pessimistic case than that of Malaysia one can look to the situation of 
the Hyderabadis and other ‘Mohajir’ migrants to Pakistan, post ’47. Here, the 
ethnography of Karen Leonard reveals a persistent pattern of prejudice against 
Hyderabadi migrants, so pervasive as to encourage many to attempt to deny 
altogether their migrant origins (as with many second and third generation migrants 
in the U.K.). 
Some Mohajirs interviewed by Karen Leonard spoke with great pride of their 
migrant identity, pointing out their elective choice to live in Pakistan, rather than 
the fact that they were merely born there. Others however, and especially the 
migrants from Hyderabad, were uncomfortable with the label, preferring to 
preserve their identity as Hyderabadis, or to integrate themselves as Pakistanis – an 
attempt which is not always welcomed. Integration has been made more difficult 
by the Pakistani government’s practice of enumerating them in the census as a 
separate ethnic group, a practice which has encouraged Mohajirs to regard 
themselves in this light (echoes here of the practice of the colonial regime in India). 
Hyderabadis were often highly educated and as migrants, like other Mohajirs, 
tended to be economically successful. This has fuelled a great deal of prejudice 
against them, and against which they have reacted. Despite this, the Hyderabadis 
have remained relatively apolitical and have kept their distance from the Mohajir 
Qaumi Movement (MQM), preferring, apparently, anonymity rather than 
association with an organisation increasingly notorious for its militancy and 
violence. More seriously, they reason that representing Mohajirs as an ethnic group 
demanding a territorial base cannot but end in disappointment and defeat. Instead, 
many are opting out and attempting to escape the Mohajir identity. This they can 
achieve through marriage, or by adopting a regional or metropolitan culture already 
extant. Thus, like some Indo-Fijians, many Hyderabadi Mohajirs apparently choose 
anonymity and self-effacement, rather than representing themselves as any sort of 
migrant, if this means adopting an ethnic stance comparable to and in opposition to 
other groups in Pakistani society. 
Politically though attempts by Mohajirs to make a place for themselves within 
the new state of Pakistan all started to come apart after 1970 when the rise of 
regionalism split the western and eastern halves of Pakistan apart. ‘Territorial 
nationalism pushed aside ideological nationalism as the dominant mode of 
thinking’ (Waseem forthcoming) and in West Pakistan, the Indus valley and 
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Punjabi origins of Pakistani civilization were increasingly emphasised, at the 
expense of Indo-Muslim civilization, thereby marginalising the Mohajirs. 
Simultaneously the accession to power of the Pakistani People’s Party in Western 
Pakistan, committed to the goal of preserving Sindhi culture against the perceived 
onslaught of Mohajirs, in the words of Mohammad Waseem, ‘spelt doom for the 
cherished world view of the migrant elite rooted in a unitarian model of politics’.  
In response to the popular four cultures identification of Pakistan – Sindhi, 
Punjabi, Baluch and Pakhtun – Mohajirs then felt entitled to create their own sub-
nationalism, centred in Karachi and Sindh. Interestingly although they inevitably 
became rivals, this rivalry did not preclude the possibility of co-operation between 
the MQM and PPP against the even greater threat from upcountry Baluch and 
Pakhtun migrants in Karachi, against whom they formed an electoral alliance in 
1988. This alliance was however a short lived phenomenon, and relationships 
between the MQM and PPP in Sindh have been marked ever since by violence, 
terrorism and periodical interventions by the military in an attempt to restore order. 
An evident fact, however, is that at any point Mohajir-Sindhi rivalry might well 
have been averted. The whole issue arose not as a result of the activities of the 
state, but due to its inactivities, and its failure on several counts to secure the legal 
rights of individuals and property. Ethnicity therefore only emerged as an 
alternative basis on which to defend these interests once the Pakistani state had 
proven itself insufficient to the task.  
 
M I G R A N T S  A N D  T H E I R  ‘ O T H E R S ’  I N  T H E  U . S . A .   
 
Our final case study, based upon the research of Aminah Mohammed, describes a 
situation far removed from the classical circumstance of Hindu-Muslim rivalry 
within the Indian sub-continent. Or so it might seem at first glance. After all, is not 
the U.S.A. the most modern of societies, certainly the most prosperous, and by its 
constitution, theoretically egalitarian and liberal? The reality of course is that the 
U.S. is not in every instance a melting pot that subsumes identities, but a nation 
that imposes an additional abstract loyalty to the flag and constitution. The U.S. 
may be extremely prosperous, but it is also one of the most economically 
competitive, unequal and violent of societies (the parallels here with Pakistan in 
many ways abound).  
Migrants from South Asia first began to arrive in the U.S.A. in considerable 
numbers in the 1960s following a liberalisation of immigration policies. Today 
there are more than a million, and since immigration policy has been biased 
towards the educated and qualified, they have been among the more successful of 
America’s citizens. Although the United States is officially a secular country, its 
interpretation of secularism, whilst separating State and religion, enjoins that equal 
respect be given to all religions (this is not far removed from the Indian idea of 
sarva dharma saramabhava). Both Muslims and Hindus in the U.S.A. are therefore 
given considerable freedom, even encouragement, in the exercise of their beliefs5. 
                                                 
5 Another important work on the relationship between religion and identity formation 
amongst South Asian migrants in the U.S.A. is by Lise McKean, 1996. 
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Because of this, and because South Asians in the U.S. are very scattered, one might 
imagine that, in this land of immigration, the relatively prosperous communities of 
Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis might have found a way of living with each 
other, a modus vivendi, far removed from the conflicts and tensions of the 
subcontinent. This is, however, far from being the case.  
In her research (1998 & forthcoming) Aminah Mohammed has pointed out a 
wide ranges of prejudices and a labyrinthine growth of associations. There are 
conflicts particularly over the issue of language. Urdu and Hindi are used as 
markers of difference, particularly among Muslims (for whom it can be a symbol 
of their religious devotion), and many South Asians will insist on speaking to other 
South Asians in Urdu or Hindi, regardless of where they come from. Most Hindus 
are in fact from Gujarat or Punjab. A rift has thus developed between the 
Hindi/Urdu speaking North Indians and the South Indians, who never meet 
together in the same associations. Amongst north Indians, the Hindus and Muslims 
also meet in separate associations, whilst amongst Muslims, Hyderabadis and those 
from a Mohajir background are to be found, as in modern Pakistan, keeping apart 
from one another and meeting in separate elite organisations Mohammed highlights 
particularly the role of community leaders, and holds them responsible for much of 
the animosity. Arguably though these rifts might still fit within classical 
instrumentalist theories of communalism. To begin with, one could point out that 
prosperity is not the same thing as economic security. The U.S. is a highly mobile 
and competitive society where expectations are high. Economic opportunities 
fluctuate, albeit at a generally much higher level than in other societies, and these 
South Asian communities will inevitably at times find themselves as economic 
rivals. An interesting point about these divisions is that they are not primarily, it 
seems, religious. Any number of geographical or linguistic bases might be found 
for the creation of a new association, but Hinduism and Islam do not have a 
monolithic function, overdetermining this process. Thus Indians will even shun 
Hindus from the Caribbean, questioning their ‘Indianness’, whilst Hindus from 
African origins will be accepted as equals. (There is most probably a class 
dimension to this, as Indians in the Caribbean were usually recruited as labourers, 
whilst those in Africa were more commonly from trading classes.)  
Amidst the mêlée of competing associations, the prospects for co-operation 
may seem limited, however there are optimists (Aminh Mohammed amongst them) 
who insist that some sort of South Asian Pan-Ethnicity will eventually emerge, 
comparable to that seen among Afro-Americans and Chinese Americans. Evidence 
for is to be seen already in annual events such as the Indian Day parades on August 
15th, which are commonly attended by South Asians from every background. The 
prospects for a South Asian pan-ethnicity also seem to be strongest amongst the 
second and third generation offspring from migrant families, who culturally have 
more in common, not least of all the American language. Within the U.K., where 
South Asian communities have been established for rather longer, this development 
has already begun to take place. The principal obstacle is the lack of an appropriate 
vocabulary (the term ‘South Asian’ itself being unrecognised both by the migrant 
and host societies), but the English language, film and popular music have all 
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provided a means of communication that transcends communal boundaries. In 
particular one can point to the contributions of musicians such as the late Nusrat 
Fateh Ali Khan, who achieved a following throughout South Asia and particularly 
among Asian communities abroad. The phenomenon of neo-bhangra has also 
become a musical means of expressing South Asian identity, albeit in a male-
dominated form, that is truly ‘post-colonial’, borrowing from every culture, and 
transcending ethno-religious boundaries. There is also of course the Bollywood 
movie industry, the stars of which enjoy a following in all parts of Asia and 
amongst every South Asian community abroad, and Pakistani ‘sufi rock’ bands 
such as Junoon, which have crossed the border in the opposite direction, winning a 
substantial following amongst Indian youth. In such ways, as James Clifford 
(1997) and Homi Bhabha (1990) have argued, old and new diasporas can offer the 
resources for emergent postcolonial identities.  
 
C O N C L U S I O N :  A  S O U T H  A S I A N  P A N - I D E N T I T Y ?  
 
One could conclude from a historical point of view that a South Asian pan-identity 
does not need to be discovered, so much as RE-discovered. There are those who 
would maintain that such an identity was present in pre-modern times (Jalal & 
Bose 1998), and from the late nineteenth century there is evidence of high levels of 
mobility, and of the internationalisation of many South Asian migrants, from both 
working and middle class origins (Bates forthcoming - a). Arguably, pre-modern 
society was always more fluid: it was the colonial period itself which saw a 6 Peter 
Emmer and Brij V. Lal are among the most enthusiastic advocates of the liberating 
effects of migration, critiqued in Bates & Carter, 1994. rigidification of custom and 
occupational specialisation, and of concomitant identities (Bates & Carter, 1994; 
Washbrook 1996). Migration overseas was a means of escaping the increasingly 
inflexible and under-employed Indian labour market, and amongst those migrant 
workers, many had become highly cosmopolitan by the end of the colonial period, 
with Indians abroad commonly raising their status, economically and socially, and 
being 're-born' into a world free of caste, if not all forms of discrimination.6 In the 
process new identities have been constructed to enable them to bridge the gap 
between the old and the new worlds and to maintain their links with both. Sadly, 
the legacy of conflict immediately before, during and after the decolonisation 
process, has commonly marred the relationship between South Asian communities, 
and between themselves and indigenous populations. The growth of postcolonial 
national identities has also commonly involved a process of definition by exclusion 
that has impacted negatively upon migrant groups, Sri Lanka and East Africa being 
here the most conspicuous examples.  
However, identities cannot exist in a vacuum as a product of will, nor are they 
solely created from elements drawn from identities of the past. The evolution of 
laws, constitutions and political assemblies, and the segregation of communities, 
are a vital part in the history of identity formation. The imperial legacy in all these 
areas has often been profound, and imperial institutions enshrining caste, class, 
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race and religion as the boundaries of South Asian communities have had 
important and longterm effects. 
Given the direction in which India is moving, and the fact that there seem at 
present to be few ominous consequences arising from the Mauritian practice of 
sustainable communalism, the question must be asked has India's Westminster-
style constitution and its independent judiciary been more of a hindrance than an 
advantage in resolving communal differences? Or alternatively, are countries like 
Mauritius treading a potentially hazardous tightrope?  
The crucial factor in communal conflicts does not simply seem to be juridicable 
rights, since although India has guaranteed the rights of minorities in legal terms, 
these guarantees do not extend into the areas of economics and the government has 
failed to provide even a minimum of subsistence for those at the bottom of the 
socioeconomic pile (Galanter 1994). The resulting upsurge in popular discontent 
has been magnified by India’s centralised, and inflexible first-past-the-post 
political system into an on-going crisis of instability in the Central Government.  
In Mauritius by contrast, although economic inequalities exist, minimum 
standards of living can be and have been more easily ensured, thereby mitigating 
differences and conflicts between communities. In the long term one might 
speculate that harmony is thus best ensured by constitutions, or at least political 
practices, that include in their definition of basic human rights, and are compelled 
to maintain in practice, a minimum of economic security and opportunity. The state 
thus needs to act as an arbiter of economic as well as political and social conflicts. 
While these problems wait to be addressed in India and elsewhere, a genuine pan-
South Asian ethnicity, that realistically could begin to resolve the material and 
spiritual inequalities of the subcontinent and its satellite communities throughout 
the globe, will remain an ambition that awaits a different generation, and a 
different set of circumstances, to that of the present for an opportunity to be 
expressed. 
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